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Magnitude-based inference and its application in 
user research 
Abstract.  Magnitude-based inference offers a theoretically justified and practically 
useful approach in any behavioural research that involves statistical inference.  This 
approach supports two important types of inference: mechanistic inference and 
practical inference to support real-world decision-making.  Therefore, this approach 
is especially suitable for user research.  We present basic elements of magnitude-
based inference and examples of its application in user research as well as its 
merits.  Finally, we discuss other approaches to statistical inference and limitations 
of magnitude-based inference, and give recommendations on how to use this type of 
inference in user research. 
Keywords: user research; quantification; statistics; inference; usability testing; user-
experience 
Highlights 
 Magnitude-based inference is a useful alternative for analysing user-research 
data. 
 Goal-setting in user research is supported by choosing a smallest important 
effect. 
 The approach uses the smallest important effect in making an inference. 
 As a consequence, a clear effect is never an artefact of sample size. 
 Practical inference is supported by weighing harm and benefit appropriately. 
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“It’s better to observe than to criticise.” (R.C. Wellins, personal communication, 
13/2/2011) 
“Best of all is to convey the magnitude of the effect and the degree of certainty 
explicitly.” (Pinker, 2014, p. 45) 
“Usually what one wants to know is not whether the change makes any difference, 
but to know how likely it is that the change will be big enough.” (Landauer, 1997, p. 
222) 
1. Introduction 
A researcher conducts a study comparing two software designs in terms of their 
usability.  She conducts usability tests with two groups, each using one of the 
designs, and collects various measures.  These include perceived usability, error 
rate and time-on-task.  The researcher then compares the two groups in terms of 
their mean scores on the measures, using a t test.  She finds that, although 
differences in mean scores are apparent, the test results do not show statistical 
significance.  What should the researcher conclude about the difference in usability 
between the two designs? 
Statistical inference is common in user research, and more generally in human-
computer interaction and the behavioural sciences.  The null hypothesis is a 
statement of the absence of the effect that is being tested, for example the difference 
in mean scores between two groups is 0.  Typically, this hypothesis is tested to 
statistically demonstrate an effect.  Sometimes, confidence intervals are added to 
provide more information or as an equivalent to (or surrogate for) the test results.  
The aim of this paper is to be translational by theoretically making the case for an 
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alternative approach, called magnitude-based inference, with several benefits for 
research in human-computer interaction, and by empirically illustrating this approach 
and its advantages, with examples from user research.  This approach has been 
implemented and used extensively in the sport and exercise sciences and is 
therefore not new.  However, we demonstrate that the approach is equally applicable 
in other domains such as user research, and human-computer interaction and 
behavioural research more generally; therefore, the use of the approach outside of 
sport and exercise is new.  To facilitate understanding, we contrast this approach 
with the traditional approach of testing the null hypothesis and use illustrative 
examples from user research.  Perhaps surprisingly, we are not advocating that 
researchers abandon the existing practice of analysing their data through tests of the 
null hypothesis with common statistical packages, but rather that they augment their 
existing practice by making more informative use of the results through magnitude-
based inference.  In particular, the results that researchers already routinely produce 
can be used as input for magnitude-based inference in ready-made spreadsheets 
that are publicly available on the Internet.  To reiterate, we do not claim to present a 
completely new method or approach, but make the case for and demonstrate the 
benefits of using a recently developed approach in sport and exercise science to a 
new domain: user research (and human-computer interaction more widely).  In this 
sense, this work aspires to be translational. 
After a brief introduction of quantification in user research in the next section, we 
discuss the existing practice of testing the null hypothesis in Section 3 and present 
magnitude-based inference as an attractive alternative in Section 4.  Section 5 
provides illustrations of the application of magnitude-based inference to further 
demonstrate its advantages.  After discussing other approaches to inference 
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(Section 6), we discuss limitations of magnitude-based inference (Section 7) and 
present recommendations for its use (Section 8). 
2. Quantification in user research 
The term ‘user research’ encompasses various activities such as usability testing 
and user-experience testing (Sauro & Lewis, 2012).  This work studies the quality of 
the interaction between human users and interactive artefacts (computers, but also 
other devices, systems and services) in leisure and at work.  More specifically, user 
research has been defined as “the systematic study of the goals, needs, and 
capabilities of users so as to specify design, construction, or improvement of tools to 
benefit how users work and live” (Schumacher, 2009, p. 6). 
Following previous work in education (Scriven, 1967) and focusing on usability 
research, Grossman et al. (2009) distinguish between formative and summative 
research.  In usability research, usability is measured as “the extent to which a 
product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, 
efficiency, in a specified context of use” (ISO, 1998, p. 2).  Typical measurements 
include psychometric data (e.g. usability- or user-experience questionnaire data), 
error rate and time-on-task.  In formative usability research, users’ interaction with an 
artefact is studied to generate data that, when analysed, provide information to 
inform system improvement.  Summative research establishes the quality interaction 
of an artefact in comparison with another artefact or a benchmark.  Sauro and 
Lewis’s (2012) first few chapters and this paper focus on quantitative inference in 
summative research. 
In particular for summative research, the use of the ‘gold-standard’ design for causal 
inference, the so-called experimental design or experiment (Cairns & Cox, 2008; 
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Purchase, 2012; Hornbæk, 2013), is recommended where appropriate (Lazar et al., 
2010).  This is because this type of design allows researchers to manipulate one or 
more the factors (independent variables, e.g., the usability of a website design) and 
observe the effects on quantitative measures, with the units of observation (human 
research participants) randomly assigned to treatments (e.g., website designs that 
differ in usability).  Although quasi-experimental designs involve the manipulation of 
one or more independent variables, these designs lack random assignment of units 
to treatments.  Because of this lack of control, causal inference is more difficult and, 
some will argue, impossible (Lazar et al., 2010).  Correlational (or non-experimental; 
Lazar et al., 2010) designs have neither manipulation nor random assignment and 
are therefore the weakest designs in terms of causal inference.  User researchers 
normally employ techniques from inferential statistics to draw conclusions from the 
data that they have collected, based on null-hypothesis significance-testing (NHST). 
3. Statistical inference in user research 
Sauro and Lewis (2012) and other human-computer interaction researchers 
(Landauer, 1997; Lazar et al., 2010) provide recommendations for statistical 
inference in user research.  The null hypothesis is tested statistically.  If the 
probability (‘p-value’) of the test result under the null hypothesis is smaller than the 
significance level (usually set at 0.05 or 5%) then the researcher rejects the null 
hypothesis and thereby concludes that there is an effect (e.g., the design of the 
websites that were compared in the research has an effect on users’ time-on-task).  
NHST can be and has been applied to experimental, quasi-experimental and 
correlational designs, although the dominant view is that only the results of 
experimental designs allow causal inference. 
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NHST is supplemented with confidence intervals and sample size estimation for 
NHST.  Confidence intervals are used to show the range of plausible values of the 
test statistic in the population (e.g., the likely range of the difference in mean score 
between two groups) and to infer whether there is a statistically significant effect.  
For example, with a mean difference of 10 points in usability scores (using the 
System Usability Scale [SUS]; Sauro, 2011), the 95%-confidence interval of the 
mean difference may have a lower limit of 5 and an upper limit of 15.  As this interval 
does not include 0, the difference in means is statistically significant at the 5%-level.  
In this inference, confidence intervals are used as an equivalent (or surrogate) 
technique for testing the null hypothesis.   
According to recommendations in the human-computer interaction literature (e.g., 
Landauer, 1997; Wilkinson et al., 1999; Cairns & Cox, 2008; Kaptein & Robertson, 
2012; Purchase, 2012; Hornbæk, 2013) and elsewhere (Wilkinson et al., 1999), 
effect sizes and descriptives should be reported as part of the results of NHST.  
However, actually achieved effect sizes are rarely reported (Hornbæk et al., 2014). 
Prospective power analysis is conducted to estimate the required sample size.  This 
is for a researcher to have a sufficient chance (e.g., 0.80 or 80%) to detect an effect 
of a particular size, if it exists, in the population from which a sample has been drawn 
in the study.  Lenth (2006-9) recommends that power analysis should be done 
prospectively rather than retrospectively and the analysis should be based on 
practically important effect sizes.  Again, this technique of sample size estimation is 
based on NHST. 
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4. Magnitude-based inference  
In this section we theoretically make the case for magnitude-based inference as an 
alternative to NHST by introducing the concepts of mechanistic and practical 
significance within magnitude-based inference as well as sample size estimation for 
both of these and by presenting its merits.  The following quotation from human-
computer interaction can be used as one of several motivations for considering the 
use of magnitude-based inference over NHST: “usually what one wants to know is 
not whether the change makes any [emphasis in original] difference, but to know 
how likely it is that the change will be big enough” (Landauer, 1997, p. 222; see also 
Drury, 2015). 
4.1. Inference of mechanistic and practical significance 
4.1.1. Mechanistic inference 
Hopkins (2007) distinguishes two types of inference as alternatives to statistical 
significance (according to NHST): mechanistic inference and practical (‘clinical’) 
inference.  Both use the probabilities of three ranges of the obtained effect as a basis 
for inference, but the two differ in their inference rules.  Mechanistic inference is used 
to test an effect irrespective of its practical application, to which we turn now. 
For descriptive purposes, an effect can be classified in terms of its size as positive, 
trivial or negative.  A positive effect falls above the threshold of the smallest 
important positive effect that is defined by the researcher.  A negative effect falls 
below the threshold of the smallest important negative effect that is defined by the 
researcher.  The size of a trivial effect lies between the thresholds of the smallest 
important negative and positive effects.   
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For inference proper, the chances of an effect being positive, negative or trivial are 
used.  The chances of the effect being positive are defined as those of the effect 
falling above the threshold of the smallest important positive effect.  The chances of 
the effect being negative are defined as those of the effect falling below the threshold 
of the smallest important positive effect.  The chances of a trivial effect are defined 
as 100% minus the sum of the chances of a positive effect and the chances of a 
negative effect (effectively these are the chances of the effect lying between the two 
thresholds). 
An inference is then made from the chances of each of three ranges of outcome 
(positivity, triviality and negativity) as follows.  An unclear effect is one that occurs if 
both the chances of the obtained effect being positive (in relation to the smallest 
important positive effect) and the chances of the effect being negative (in relation to 
the smallest important negative effect) are too large (e.g., both greater than the 
default value of 0.05 or another cut-offs that is deemed appropriate for positivity and 
negativity).  Otherwise, the effect is clear, seen as substantially positive, negative or 
trivial and considered to have the size of the observed value, with a qualification of 
probability (see Table 1).   
As an illustration, Figure 1 (top, mechanistic inference) shows chances for the three 
ranges of the obtained effect size (positivity, triviality and negativity) “that the true 
value will have the observed magnitude of the outcome statistic” (Batterham & 
Hopkins, 2006, p. 54), cut-offs of chances and inference through qualitative 
descriptors for mechanistic inference (from Table 1).  For example, the first result in 
Figure 1 under ‘mechanistic inference’ shows chances of 0.01% of the effect being 
negative, 0.99% of the effect being trivial and 99% of the effect being positive.  The 
qualitative descriptors from Table 1 are then applied to infer that the effect is very 
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likely positive (between 95% and 99.5%).  For another example, the third result 
shows chances of 2% of the effect being negative, 33% of the effect being trivial and 
65% of the effect being positive.  The qualitative descriptors from Table 1 are then 
applied to infer that the effect is possibly positive (between 25% and 75%).  For a 
final example, the last result shows chances of 7% of the effect being negative, 36% 
of the effect being trivial and 57% of the effect being positive.  Because the chances 
of the effect being positive and the chances of the effect being negative both exceed 
5% the inference is that the result is unclear; the advice would be to collect more 
data in order to achieve a clear result. 
_____ Insert Table 1 about here. _____ 
_____ Insert Figure 1 about here. _____ 
4.1.2. Practical inference 
Practical inference is used to test an effect that has a practical application.  For 
descriptive purposes, an effect can be classified in terms of its size as beneficial, 
negligible or harmful.  A beneficial effect falls above the threshold of the smallest 
important beneficial effect that is defined by the researcher.1  A harmful effect falls 
below the threshold of the smallest important harmful effect that is defined by the 
researcher.  The size of a negligible effect lies between the thresholds of the 
smallest important harmful and beneficial effects. 
                                            
1 This is true if a beneficial effect is defined as positive, for example an increased hit rate on the 
improved version of a website compared to the existing version.  If the a beneficial effect is defined 
as negative, for example decreased time-on-task on the improved version of a website compared 
to the existing version, then a beneficial effect would be defined as falling below the (negative) 
threshold of the smallest important beneficial effect.  Along similar lines, a similar caveat applies to 
the definition of a harmful effect. 
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For inference proper, the chances of an effect being beneficial, harmful or negligible 
are used.  The chances of the effect being beneficial are defined as those of the 
effect falling above the threshold of the smallest important beneficial effect.  The 
chances of the effect being harmful are defined as those of the effect falling below 
the threshold of the smallest important harmful effect.  The chances of a negligible 
effect are defined as 100% minus the sum of the chances of a beneficial effect and 
the chances of a harmful effect (effectively these are the chances of the effect lying 
between the two thresholds). 
Inference of the practical importance of an effect is based on the notions of Type-1 
practical (‘clinical’) error and Type-2 practical error.  The concept of Type-1 practical 
error is analogous to that of Type-I error in NHST (rejecting the null hypothesis when 
it is true); the concept of Type-2 practical error is analogous to that of Type-II error in 
NHST (retaining the null hypothesis when it is false).  In practical inference, Hopkins’ 
(2007) underlying idea is that, in the practical (‘clinical’) application of effects, the 
chance of using a harmful effect (a Type-1 practical error) needs to be far smaller 
than that of not using a beneficial effect (a Type-2 practical error), irrespective of the 
exact size of these chances. 
An inference is then made from the chances of each of three ranges of outcome 
(benefit, negligibility and harm) as follows.  If the chances of the effect being 
beneficial (in relation to the smallest important beneficial effect) are greater than the 
suggested cut-off of 25% for a Type-2 practical error and the chances of the effect 
being harmful (in relation to the smallest important harmful effect) are greater than 
the suggested cut-off of 0.5% for a Type-1 practical error then the effect is unclear.  
If the chances of benefit are greater than 25% and the chances of harm are smaller 
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than 0.5% then the effect is clearly beneficial.  Otherwise, the effect is clearly 
negligible or harmful. 
As an illustration, Figure 1 (bottom, practical inference) shows chances for the three 
ranges of the obtained effect size (benefit, negligibility and harm) that the true value 
will have the observed magnitude of the outcome statistic, cut-offs of chances and 
inference through qualitative descriptors for practical inference (from Table 1).  For 
example, the first result in Figure 1 under ‘mechanistic inference’ shows chances of 
0.01% of the effect being harmful, .99% of the effect being negligible and 99% of the 
effect being beneficial.  The qualitative descriptors from Table 1 are then applied to 
infer that the effect is very likely beneficial (between 95% and 99.5%) and the 
recommendation is to use the effect (for example, to choose the new improved 
version of a website over the existing version).  For another example, the third result 
shows chances of 2% of the effect being harmful, 33% of the effect being negligible 
and 65% of the effect being beneficial.  Because the chances of harm exceed the 
cut-off for a Type-1 practical error (.5%) even though the chances of benefit exceed 
the cut-off for a Type-2 practical error (25%), the effect is deemed unclear and the 
recommendation is not to use the effect (for example, not to choose the new 
improved version of a website over the existing version).  Note that here mechanistic 
inference (clear and ‘possibly positive’) and practical inference (‘unclear; do not use’) 
differ.  This is because the two types of inference use different inference rules.  For a 
final example, the last result shows chances of 7% of the effect being harmful, 36% 
of the effect being negligible and 57% of the effect being beneficial.  Again, because 
the chances of harm exceed the cut-off for a Type-1 practical error (.5%) even 
though the chances of benefit exceed the cut-off for a Type-2 practical error (25%), 
the effect is deemed unclear and the recommendation is not to use the effect. 
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In user research and human-computer interaction more generally, as in other 
domains, practical inference would be attempted when benefit and harm can be 
defined.  In the context of sport and exercise science, an intervention would be 
deemed harmful were it to cause a decrease in typical sporting performance/fitness. 
Harm may also be evident when comparing two different interventions. For example, 
a new training technique designed to improve speed may result in a smaller 
improvement in performance than the traditional approach to speed training – in this 
regard the new training would be considered harmful. 
Examples of outcomes of human-computer interaction with benefit include faster and 
more accurate task performance as a result of better designed human-computer 
interfaces (Nielsen, 1993).  Instances of outcomes with harm include infection by 
malware as a result of breached computer security when users act erroneously in 
response to malware warnings (Atzeni et al., 2014), patients’ death as a result of 
healthcare staff erroneously entering numbers on medical devices (Oladimeji et al., 
2011; Wiseman et al., 2013), violations of privacy by Internet-enabled robots for 
personal or domestic use when these robots share “the information required for 
object recognition, navigation and task completion in the real world” (Pagallo, 2013, 
p. 501) and financial, physical and psychological privacy threats as a result of people 
using wearable sensors that continuously capture physiological data and use these 
to infer “the wearer’s behavior and psychological state in realtime” (Raij et al., 2011, 
p. 12).  As in other fields (e.g. sport and exercise science), in human-computer 
interaction, a negligible effect can be defined as one that is neither beneficial nor 
harmful. 
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Hopkins (2007) suggests using cut-off points for % chances of 0.5% for harm and 
25% for benefit.2  As an alternative decision rule, Hopkins et al. (2009) suggest 
researchers should conclude that an effect is clear if the odds of benefit are 66 times 
greater than the odds of harm or vice versa; otherwise, the result is unclear.  The 
justification for the choice of an odds ratio of 1:66 as a cut-off is that this corresponds 
with the suggested default probabilities of 0.005 for harm and 0.25 for benefit.  As an 
illustration, Figure 1 (bottom) shows chances for the three ranges of effect size 
(harm, negligibility and benefit) that the true value will have the observed magnitude 
of the outcome statistic, probability cut-offs and inference through qualitative 
descriptors for practical inference.  This further demonstrates the richness of 
magnitude-based inferences. 
For reporting results in a publication, Hopkins (2007) recommends presenting 90%-
confidence intervals and mechanistic inference for all effects.  Batterham and 
Hopkins (2006) recommend using a 90% level of confidence to avoid the CI being 
used as a surrogate NHST.  This choice is deemed appropriate, as the authors 
consider the chances of the true value higher than the upper limit or lower than the 
lower limit both at 0.05 as ‘very unlikely’ (see Table 1).  For effects that have a direct 
practical application, practical inference should also be reported.  For instance, when 
a new interaction technique is compared with an existing interaction technique it may 
be possible to define harm and benefit in terms of speed and accuracy, with the 
existing method as a baseline, and practical inference would be appropriate.  
However, if two methods are compared and neither can be seen as a baseline, harm 
and benefit would not be defined, so practical inference would not be attempted. 
                                            
2 Although the suggested defaults are well argued by Hopkins (2007), they are not ‘set in stone’ and 
researchers can define their own probabilities for harm and benefit, based on their own judgement. 
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Mechanistic and practical inference will often, but not always, be consistent with 
each other.  The reason why any differences are unavoidable is that it is 
recommended in mechanistic inference for thresholds for substantially positive and 
negative effects to be equal, but in practical inference they should be unequal, as the 
chance of using a harmful effect should be much smaller than the chance of not 
using a beneficial effect. 
4.1.3. Smallest important effect 
The approach of magnitude-based inference forces a researcher to specify the 
minimum mechanistically and practically important effect, whereas in NHST the data 
are normally tested against an unrealistic null effect.  The researcher can select an 
effect size based on theoretical or practical considerations.  Within the sport and 
exercise science literature, the smallest worthwhile effect can be determined in one 
of three ways. Firstly, from years of practical experience of working with a sport, a 
researcher can develop a sound belief of what change in performance is needed to 
justify putting their athletes through an intervention.  Secondly, the recent 
quantification and publication of the within-athlete variability between performances 
in several different sports provides researchers with important information of the 
smallest effect needed to detect a worthwhile change in performance.  For example, 
the between-competition variability for top junior swimmers is ~1%; therefore, any 
strategy to improve performance needs to be at least 0.5 of this variability (Stewart & 
Hopkins, 2000).  Finally, in the absence of a priori belief or statistical quantification of 
what would constitute the smallest worthwhile change in performance, inferences 
can be based on proposed standardised thresholds for small, moderate and large 
changes of 0.2, 0.6 and 1.2 SDs (Hopkins et al., 2009).  Still, researchers can define 
their own thresholds for effect size, based on their own judgement. 
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In user research and human-computer interaction more generally, the choice of a 
smallest mechanistically or practically relevant effect may be based on different 
considerations.  First, a history of practical experience working in a particular area, 
such as website usability, may indicate what change in, for example, a usability 
metric, is needed to justify a design- or purchase decision (Landauer, 1997), for 
example a 10% improvement in touchscreen accuracy.  Second, consistent with 
principles of usability engineering (Wixon, 2011), a research team may set a 
measurable product goal in a process of continual improvement as the smallest 
required change that is considered important (e.g., a 20-point difference on the SUS 
– Sauro & Lewis, 2012, p. 71; Sauro, 2011, p. 125; or a or 1-standard deviation 
difference – Sauro, 2011, p. 120). 
4.1.4. Magnitude-based inference for designs and contexts in human-computer 
interaction 
Studies with three types of design – experimental, quasi-experimental and 
correlational – can benefit from the application of magnitude-based inference, each 
time by using the results from NHST as input for inference.  For instance, the 
following results of an unrelated t test for comparing two website designs in terms of 
perceived usability, as measured by the SUS, can be entered into the appropriate 
spreadsheet for raw difference between means and other t-distributed effect 
statistics: p-value, mean difference, degrees of freedom, confidence level and 
smallest important effect (e.g., a 20-point difference on the SUS).  The main results 
from the spreadsheet include chances for the three ranges of effect size 
(negative/harmful, trivial/negligible and positive/beneficial) and odds of benefit to 
harm. 
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Magnitude-based inference can also be applied in various contexts within human-
computer interaction.  In the following examples, bear in mind Hopkins’ (2007) 
advice to use mechanistic inference for all effects and, additionally, practical 
inference for effects that have a direct practical application.  Lab-based experiments 
(except usability tests) will normally use mechanistic inference only.  As an example, 
the effect of user-interfaces on task performance in a lab environment (Komarov et 
al., 2013) would be tested using t tests on specific comparisons of interest between 
interfaces, with the results as input for magnitude-based inference on the difference 
between means in terms of the chances that the effect tested in each comparison 
was positive, trivial or negative (e.g. “likely positive”).  As in Komarov et al.’s (2013) 
study, field experiments and usability tests will normally use both mechanistic and 
practical inference. Therefore, in addition to mechanistic inference, the results of t 
tests would also be used as input for magnitude-based inference on the difference 
between means in terms of the chances that each effect was beneficial, negligible or 
harmful and, based on this, a recommendation for practical use for each effect would 
follow (e.g., “very likely beneficial – use”).  Correlational studies will normally use 
mechanistic inference only.  As an example, the relation between personality and 
user-experience (De Oliveira et al., 2013) can be tested using Pearson’s correlation, 
with the results as input for magnitude-based inferences on the correlation in terms 
of the chances that each correlation was positive, trivial or negative (e.g., the 
correlation coefficient shows a likely small, possibly moderate etc. relationship). 
4.1.5. Software support 
Various spreadsheets (http://www.sportsci.org/) have been developed to support 
mechanistic and practical inference for numerous statistics.  In one of these 
spreadsheets (xcl.xls), the inference is based on the following input: a p-value, the 
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value of the effect size statistic (e.g., mean difference), degrees of freedom (where 
applicable), confidence level, and threshold values for a beneficial or positive effect 
and for a harmful or negative effect.  The required input to the spreadsheet can be 
obtained as output from statistical analysis conducted with a common statistics 
package, or a general-purpose package with statistical functions, such as a 
spreadsheet program. 
4.1.6. Illustrative example from sport- and exercise science 
Here, we provide an example of the application of magnitude-based inferences 
within the domain of sport and exercise science.  A sports researcher is interested in 
whether a new, commercially available nutritional supplement has a beneficial or 
harmful effect on elite cyclists’ 40 km time-trial performance – the faster the time, the 
better the performance.  The researcher conducts an experiment to examine the 
effect of two different doses of the supplement, a low dose and a high dose.  An 
experimental crossover design is used whereby all of the cyclists perform the time 
trial under three different conditions (placebo [no supplement], low dose and high 
dose), in a counterbalanced manner.  The researcher’s experience led to the belief 
that the smallest worthwhile change in 40 km time-trial performance was -1%.  The 
mean (± SD) performance times were 59.5 ± 1.6 min (low dose), 60.9 ± 2.2 min (high 
dose) and 60.5 ± 1.9 min (placebo), and the application of magnitude-based 
inferences enabled the sports researcher to calculate the % chances of benefit (or 
harm), with reference to a change of -1%.  The following inferences are based on the 
results of t tests, conducted with a common statistics package, which are 
subsequently used as input into a spreadsheet (xcl.xls) for magnitude-based 
inference (available at http://www.sportsci.org/).  In this example, compared to 
placebo, the low dose improved performance by -1.7% (90%-confidence interval -2.4 
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to -0.9%), with a 92% chance of benefit and 0.0% chance of harm; a low dose of the 
supplement is therefore likely to be beneficial and recommended.  However, 
compared to placebo, the high dose impaired performance by 0.7% (90%-confidence 
interval -0.1 to 1.5%), with a 0% chance of benefit and a 25% chance of harm; a high 
dose of the supplement is therefore most unlikely beneficial and not recommended. 
4.2. Sample size estimation 
Corresponding with Hopkins’ (Batterham & Hopkins, 2006; Hopkins, 2007) two types 
of magnitude-based inference from sample data, Hopkins (2006a) has developed 
two techniques for estimating the required sample size for empirical studies.  These 
techniques are used instead of the common technique of power analysis to 
estimating sample size based on NHST.  Typically, the required sample sizes in the 
new techniques are two to three times smaller than those in the old technique. 
The new techniques “are based on (a) acceptable error rates for a […] practical 
decision arising from the study and (b) adequate precision for the effect magnitude” 
(Hopkins, 2006a, p. 65).  The first technique (for [a]) estimates the required sample 
size for practical inference.  The minimum sample size is selected such that, given 
the smallest harmful and beneficial important effects specified by the researcher, a 
particular ‘decision’ value of the effect size is identified.   For this effect size the 
probability of a Type-1 practical error (using an effect as beneficial when real-world 
application is harmful) is 0.005 and the probability of a Type-2 practical error 
(choosing not to use an effect that in real-world application is beneficial) is 0.25.  The 
second technique (for [b]) estimates the required sample size for mechanistic 
inference.  The minimum sample size is selected such that, given the smallest 
mechanistically important effect specified by the researcher, the confidence interval 
does not overlap substantial positive and negative values. 
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4.3. Benefits of magnitude-based inference 
Magnitude-based inference has been developed in sport and exercise science (e.g., 
Batterham & Hopkins, 2006; Hopkins, 2007; Hopkins et al., 2009), supported by 
spreadsheets freely available on the Internet.  This approach is increasingly being 
applied, as shown by a rapid growth in publications using this approach and by 
citations (for Hopkins et al. [2009] from 8 citations in 2009 to 214 in 2014, with more 
than 740 citations in total).  Research using this approach has been published in 
many of the leading journals in sport and exercise science (e.g., Medicine and 
Science in Sports and Exercise, Sports Medicine, Journal of Science and Medicine 
in Sport, and International Journal of Sports Physiology and Performance). 
Magnitude-based inference is particularly suited for user research, as it can provide 
clearly interpretable and relevant results.  However, until now this type of inference 
has remained unfamiliar in user research and human-computer interaction.  Based 
on our presentation of magnitude-based inference in the previous sections, we now 
present some of its main features and benefits. 
1 Requires the researcher to define a smallest important effect.  Instead of testing a 
point hypothesis (Murphy & Myors, 1999), magnitude-based inference makes 
inferences with respect to three ranges of the effect size in relation to the smallest 
important effect (see Figure 1): negative, trivial and positive in mechanistic inference 
or harmful, negligible and beneficial in practical inference (Batterham & Hopkins, 
2006).  The purpose of the inference of mechanistic importance is to decide on the 
existence of a cause-effect or correlational relationship between variables, 
irrespective of its practical importance.  The purpose of the inference of practical 
importance is to aid real-world decision-making regarding the use or implementation 
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of, for example, a new training method (in sport and exercise) or a new product 
design (in user research), irrespective of mechanistic importance.   
2 Uses the smallest important effect size, together with the observed effect, as an 
integral part of inference.  As a consequence, inferences are not an artefact of 
sample size.  For example, in mechanistic inference a trivially small effect (smaller 
than the smallest important effect), will be unclear if the sample size is too small or 
trivial otherwise, but will never become positive or negative.   
3 Provides a rigorous and principled approach to infer practical significance, and 
provides a rigorous distinction between practical and mechanistic significance.  
Inference addresses benefit and harm, and by doing so facilitates decision-making 
on the practical relevance of an effect.   
4 Provides a refined classification of inferences using descriptors of the probability 
(see Table 1) of each of three outcome ranges (positivity/benefit, triviality/negligibility 
and negativity/harm) that can be made.   As a result of refined inference, practically 
and mechanistically worthwhile effects are more likely to be detected as substantial 
and therefore deemed publishable; therefore, researchers are more likely to be able 
to draw useful conclusions from the data and publication bias can be reduced. 
5 Estimates of required sample size are based on practical significance or 
mechanistic significance and researcher-defined smallest important effect. 
5. The application of magnitude-based inference in user research 
In this section we illustrate the benefits of magnitude-based inference with examples 
from user research.  We start by presenting and interpreting results from usability 
studies comparing product versions (Sauro and Lewis, 2012).  We then use the 
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results of various further examples of applying magnitude-based inference in user 
research as a basis for deriving some general observations.  Next, we fully present 
an example of sample size estimation for a between-subjects design.  Finally, we 
discuss magnitude-based inference for research designs beyond simple between-
subjects and within-subjects. 
5.1. Comparing two versions of a product 
In usability-testing, inferential statistics are most commonly used to compare two 
product versions in order to assess usability and make appropriate important 
decisions (Rubin, 1994).   This analysis is frequently employed when an organisation 
is considering to upgrade to a new version of a product, an organisation is intending 
to purchase one of two products for the same purpose or a manufacturer or software 
developer is deciding whether to launch a new product version to replace an existing 
version.  Either a within-subjects design (each test user employs all different designs 
being compared) or a between-subjects design (each test user employs one of the 
different designs) is used to compare two designs or products.  Here, we present two 
examples based on cases published by Sauro and Lewis (2012).3 
Example 1, between-subjects design.  In a usability test of a customer-relation 
management (CRM) application, test users have to add a customer’s contact details 
to the application (Sauro and Lewis, 2012, pp. 72-73).  Eleven test users employ the 
existing version, nine the new Version A and another nine new Version B.  A cost-
benefit analysis has demonstrated that in order to earn back the cost of the new 
version a reduction of at least 20% in time-on-task is needed; therefore, this value is 
                                            
3 A further illustrative example is presented in Online Appendix A. 
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set as the smallest important effect, so with the new versions the task should take at 
least 20% less time than with the original version. 
Mean (±SD) time-on-task was 37±23 s for the existing version, 18±13 s for new 
Version A and 22±11 s for new Version B.4  The application of magnitude-based 
inferences enabled the research team to calculate the % chances of benefit (or 
harm) as a result of adopting the new versions, with reference to a change of 20%, 
which equates to 7 s.  The following inferences are based on the results of t tests for 
independent samples, conducted with a common statistics package, which are 
subsequently used as input into a spreadsheet for magnitude-based inference (see 
Supplementary Material A [and http://sssl-staffweb.tees.ac.uk/U0011128/mbi/]; main 
results are presented in Table 2).  This is the original sheet ‘Confidence limits & 
clinical chances’ (at http://www.sportsci.org/resource/stats/; Hopkins, 2007) that has 
been modified for illustrative purposes; we recommend that researchers use 
Hopkins’ original sheet for their research and reference accordingly. 
_____ Insert Table 2 about here. _____ 
_____ Interested readers consult Supplementary Material A about here. _____ 
Compared to the existing version, time-on-task with new Version A was 19 s faster 
(90%-confidence interval 4 to 34 s), with a 90.4% chance of benefit, a 9.3% chance 
of negligibility, 0.4% chance of harm and an odds ratio of benefit to harm of 2929 in 
relation to the smallest important effect of 7 s.  The use of the new Version A over 
the existing version of CRM application is therefore likely to be beneficial, the 
chances of harm are less than 0.5% and the chances of benefit are greater than 
                                            
4 Sauro and Lewis (2012) analysed the mean difference between the existing version and new 
Version A with t test for independent samples and NHST rather than with magnitude-based 
inference. 
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25%.  Given this result and provided the same pattern of results occurs with other 
essential tasks as the one studied here, new Version A is recommended (practical 
inference).  Furthermore, the effect is likely to be positive and unlikely to be trivial 
(mechanistic inference). 
Compared to the existing version, time-on-task with new Version B was 15 s faster 
(90%-confidence interval 1 to 30 s), with a 82.8% chance of benefit, a 16.6% chance 
of negligibility, 0.6% chance of harm and an odds ratio of benefit to harm of 749 in 
relation to the smallest important effect of 7 s.  The effect of using the Version B over 
the existing version of the CRM application is therefore unlikely negligible and not 
recommended (practical inference), as the chances of harm are greater than 0.5% 
while the chances of benefit are greater than 25%.5  Furthermore, the effect is likely 
to be positive and unlikely to be trivial (mechanistic inference).   
Example 2, within-subjects design.  In a usability test of an accounting application, 
test users have to create an expense report (Sauro and Lewis, 2012, pp. 72-73).  
Twenty-one test users employ the existing version, new Version X and new Version 
Y in counterbalanced order.  As a smallest important effect size, a 20% time-saving 
was required for the new versions to make a demonstrable difference, according to a 
cost-benefit analysis. 
Mean (± SD) time-on-task was 231±88 s for the existing version, 152±45 s for new 
Version X and 207±45 s for new Version Y.6  The application of magnitude-based 
inferences enabled the research team to calculate the % chances of benefit (or 
                                            
5 Note that if in advance of data collection, the researcher had decided to use Hopkins et al.’s (2009) 
alternative decision rule (the odds ratio of benefit to harm must be greater than a cut-off value of 
66 for an effect to be beneficial) then the inference would be that the effect is beneficial, as the 
obtained odds ratio exceeds the cut-off. 
6 Sauro and Lewis (2012) analysed the mean difference between the existing version and new 
Version X with t test for paired samples and NHST rather than with magnitude-based inference. 
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harm) as a result of adopting the new versions, with reference to a change of 20%, 
which equates to 58 s.  The following inferences are based on the results of t tests 
for paired samples, conducted with a common statistics package, which are 
subsequently used as input into a spreadsheet for magnitude-based inference (see 
Supplementary Material A; main results are presented in Table 3).   
_____ Insert Table 3 about here. _____ 
_____ Interested readers consult Supplementary Material A about here. _____ 
Compared to the existing version, time-on-task with new Version X was 80 s faster 
(90%-confidence interval 56 to 104 s), with a 93.4% chance of benefit, a 6.6% 
chance of negligibility, 0.0% chance of harm and an odds ratio of benefit to harm of 
6757803893 in relation to the smallest important effect of 58 s.  The use of new 
Version X over the existing version of CRM application is therefore likely to be 
beneficial, with chances of harm less than 0.5% and the chances of benefit greater 
than 25%. Given this result and provided the same pattern of results occurs with 
other essential tasks as the one studied here, the adoption of new Version X is 
recommended (practical inference).  Furthermore, the effect is likely to be positive 
and unlikely to be trivial (mechanistic inference).   
Compared to the existing version, time-on-task with new Version Y was 25 s faster 
(90%-confidence interval 1 to 49 s), with a 1.4% chance of benefit, a 98.6% chance 
of negligibility, 0.0% chance of harm and an odds ratio of benefit to harm of 3579 in 
relation to the smallest important effect of 58 s.  The effect of using the new version 
over the existing version of CRM application is therefore unclear and not 
recommended (practical inference), as the chances of benefit are less than 25% 
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even though the chances of harm are less than 0.5%.7  Furthermore, the effect is 
very likely to be trivial (mechanistic inference).  Following these two examples, a 
further illustrative example is presented in Online Appendix A. 
_____ Interested readers consult Online Appendix A about here. _____ 
5.2. General observations 
We make the following general observations from the results and inferences 
presented in a further example of a two-group between-subjects design in Online 
Appendix B and (mean-BS-SUS-1 in) Supplementary Material A. 
1 The results of both practical and mechanistic inference for the same data set differ 
as a function of researcher-defined cut-offs for clinically or practically important 
harmful/negative and beneficial/positive effect sizes.  
2 A wide range of practical and mechanistic inferences is observed.  These types of 
inference are refined in the sense that they provide a considerable differentiation of 
clear results (‘is almost certainly (not) harmful/trivial/beneficial’, ‘is very (un)likely to 
be harmful/trivial/beneficial’, ‘is (un)likely to be harmful/trivial/beneficial’, ‘is probably 
(not) harmful/trivial/beneficial’, ‘is possibly (not) harmful/trivial/beneficial’/may (not) be 
harmful/trivial/beneficial’). 
3 Practical and mechanistic inference mostly concur.  However, an unclear effect 
according to mechanistic inference (‘unclear; get more data’) may be clear in 
practical inference (e.g. ‘possibly harmful, unlikely beneficial; don't use’ or ‘unlikely 
                                            
7 Note that if in advance of data collection, the researcher had decided to use Hopkins et al.’s (2009) 
alternative decision rule (the odds ratio of benefit to harm must be greater than a cut-off value of 
66 for an effect to be beneficial) then the inference would be that the effect is beneficial, as the 
obtained odds ratio exceeds the cut-off.  In this case, the odds-ratio rule would produce a 
surprising result.  Such surprising results could be avoided by the following perhaps more 
acceptable odd-ratio rule: odds ratio greater than 66 and chances of benefit greater than 25%. 
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harmful, unlikely beneficial; don't use’). The reverse may also occur with a clear 
result in mechanistic inference (e.g., ‘possibly trivial’) that is unclear according to 
practical inference (‘unclear; don't use; get more data’).  As explained in Section 4.2, 
such differences in results between these two types of inferences cannot be avoided.  
These differences should not necessarily be seen as a problem, but as an 
opportunity to clarify the difference between practical and mechanistic importance.  
There is a time-honoured idea that a particular set of results may be theoretically 
interesting, but practically unimportant.  The approach of magnitude-based inference 
enables, or rather forces, researchers to make explicit their choices of thresholds for 
mechanistically (theoretically) important and practically important effects.  As a 
consequence, an inference of practical importance, together with an inference of a 
lack of mechanistic importance from the same data can be defended by a researcher 
who has made these choices.  The results presented in Supplementary Material A 
may even overestimate the concordance between the conclusions from mechanistic 
inference and practical inference.  This is because in these results the same 
thresholds are chosen for practically beneficial and mechanistically positive effects 
on the one hand and for practically harmful and mechanistically negative effects on 
the other hand.  However, depending on the seriousness of a harmful effect, a 
researcher may, for example choose a higher threshold for practical significance 
(e.g., d = 0.8) and a lower threshold for mechanistic importance (e.g., d = 0.2), 
leading to different conclusions from practical inference (more conservative here) 
and mechanistic inference (less conservative here). 
4 The results of practical and mechanistic inference concur about half of the time 
with those of statistical inference.  When the results differ, the latter is more 
conservative. 
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5.3. Sample size estimation 
Table 4 presents condensed results for sample size estimation of a two-group 
between subjects design.  (Full results are presented in Supplementary Material B 
[and http://sssl-staffweb.tees.ac.uk/U0011128/mbi/], tabulated Sheet mean-t-test-BS.  
This is the original sheet ‘Sample-size estimation’ (at 
http://www.sportsci.org/resource/stats/; Hopkins, 2006a) that has been modified for 
illustrative purposes; we recommend that researchers use Hopkins’ original sheet for 
their research and reference accordingly.)  Required sample size decreases rapidly 
with increasing smallest important effect size in all three types of inference.  Sample 
sizes for mechanistic and practical inference concur with smaller effect sizes, but 
with larger effect sizes mechanistic inference tends to require smaller sample sizes 
than practical inference does. 
_____ Insert Table 4 about here. _____ 
_____ Interested readers consult Supplementary Material B about here. _____ 
5.4. Further designs 
Supplementary Materials A and B present further examples, with data adapted from 
Sauro and Lewis (2012).  The classification of designs is based on, and the 
examples themselves are adapted from this recent text on the use of statistical 
methods in user research.  We encourage interested readers to explore those 
examples that appeal most to them and thereby develop a further appreciation for 
the range of applications of magnitude-based inference.  However, to save valuable 
space and avoid repetition, we do not discuss the results of these examples.  In any 
case, the conclusions are consistent with, and provide further support for those 
presented in Section 5.1.2.  In Supplementary Material A, the first is a further 
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example of a comparison of means with two systems on time-on-task in a between-
subjects design.  Two examples of comparisons of means between two systems with 
within-subjects design and perceived-usability data and time data follow.  Then there 
are two examples of comparison of a mean against a target (perceived-usability data 
and time-on-task data).  Finally, examples of comparing proportions between two 
systems (between subjects, purchase [‘conversion-rate’] data; within subjects, task-
completion data) and comparing a proportion with a target (task-success data) are 
presented.8  Supplementary Material B presents further examples of sample size 
estimation, for a within-subjects design comparing means and for a design 
comparing two proportions (between subjects, within subjects) or a proportion 
against a target.9  The conclusions that the reader can draw from these examples 
concur with those drawn in Section 5.2. 
In Section 5 we have illustrated magnitude-based inference with examples using 
basic research designs to further facilitate the reader’s understanding of this type of 
inference.  However, more complex research designs can also be analysed (e.g., 
Hopkins, 2006b).  Currently, the available spreadsheets (http://www.sportsci.org/)  
support the various analyses, including the following: raw difference between means 
and other t-distributed effect statistics; percent and factor difference between means 
and other log t-distributed effect statistics; rate ratio and other log-normally 
distributed effect statistics; correlation coefficient; standard deviation, coefficient of 
variation or root mean square error; ratio of two independent standard deviations; 
combining outcomes for subject groups or statistics.  Analysis of the following types 
                                            
8 These examples use adjustments in calculating probabilities and sample sizes, as advocated by 
Sauro and Lewis (2012).  Calculations are then made using the standard normal distribution as an 
approximation for the binomial distribution, as sample size is sufficient (Clark-Carter, 2009). 
9  Again, the standard normal distribution is used to provide approximations. 
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of design is supported: (1) basic experimental between-subjects designs and within-
subjects designs with an independent variable having two levels; (2) complex 
multifactor experimental designs with two levels per factor – this is possible because 
both main effects and interaction effects can be tested directionally, with df = 1; (3) 
pre-post parallel-groups controlled designs with adjustment for a predictor, post-
measure-only crossover design with adjustment for a predictor, and pre-post 
crossover design with adjustment for a predictor; (4) single-group designs (e.g., 
testing the sample mean against the known value of a population mean) and 
correlational designs. 
Magnitude-based inference does not support analyses of complex designs with 
effects having more than one degree of freedom (e.g., as in analysis of variance).  
However, it has been proposed that omnibus tests (with df > 1) should not be 
conducted in any case and that, instead, (all) inferential statistics should be 
conducted through (planned, directional) contrasts (Rosenthal et al., 2000; see also 
Dienes, 2011), and these are supported by the spreadsheets.  This will require 
researchers to think carefully about how to answer their research questions through 
the analysis of specific contrasts rather than relying on omnibus tests. 
The fundamental reason is that magnitude-based inference, as described in this 
paper, cannot be applied when the tested effect is not directional, for example an 
omnibus effect in analysis of variance (ANOVA) or a model test of R2 in multiple 
regression analysis.  This is because unsigned (omnibus) effects are tested in these 
analyses, so it is logically impossible to test whether these effects are positive or 
negative.   
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For those who still wish to test an effect with df > 1, in the spirit of magnitude-based 
inference, it would be natural to conduct a minimum-effect test (Murphy & Myors, 
1999), with the output of null-hypothesis-testing (e.g., F-value) as input.  The 
smallest important effect in magnitude-based inference corresponds with what is 
called the researcher-defined minimal effect in minimum-effect tests.  This effect can 
be tested either as a statistical-significance test (as in Murphy & Myors, 1999) or the 
same qualitative descriptors that are used in magnitude-based inference may be 
employed here (most likely, very likely etc.; see Table 1).  If an omnibus minimum-
effect test in ANOVA shows a substantial effect, then this could be followed up with 
specific directional comparisons by way of magnitude-based inference.   
6. Other approaches to statistical inference 
Even though the use of NHST is common in user research and elsewhere, several 
limitations of have been noted in the behavioural-research literature, with cogent 
calls for abandoning NHST altogether (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Cumming, 2014; Dienes, 
2011; Rozeboom, 1997).  From the perspective of magnitude-based inference, it is 
most important to note that (a) NHST does not require the researcher to specify a 
smallest important effect and (b) NHST does not use such an effect in making 
inferences.  However, as shown in this paper, the results of NHST can be used as 
input for magnitude-based inference, addressing both of these issues.  Apart from 
magnitude-based inference, other alternatives to NHST have also been proposed.  
In human-computer interaction, Landauer (1997) has suggested using the odds of 
obtaining the actual difference between two experimental conditions “merely by 
chance”, (1 - p-value)/p-value (p. 222). The counter-null statistic (Rosenthal & Rubin, 
1994) is the non-null-magnitude effect size that has the same p-value as the null 
value of the effect size.  It can be used to highlight the possibility of a (substantial) 
32/47 
 
effect when, in fact, the null hypothesis is not rejected.  In that sense, it is 
reminiscent of findings in our examples presented in Online Appendix B showing that 
mechanistic or practical inference can demonstrate an important effect that goes 
undetected in statistical inference.  prep (Killeen, 2005) is the probability of future 
research replicating the obtained result.  p-intervals (Cumming, 2008) provide a 
range of likely p-values in the analysis of a particular data set.  Each of these 
alternatives remains based on NHST, with inherent limitations (e.g., Cohen, 1994; 
Cumming, 2014; Dienes, 2011; Rozeboom, 1997).  The same goes for the analysis 
of mixed-effect models, which has been proposed for designs with repeated 
measures, multi-level designs and designs with missing data. 
Minimum-effect tests (Murphy & Myors, 1999) have been proposed as an advance 
over NHST.  This is because the null hypothesis of no effect (the ‘nil hypothesis’) is 
replaced with a null hypothesis of a minimal effect (similar to the smallest 
positive/beneficial or negative/positive important effect in magnitude-based 
inference), specified by the researcher.  Nonetheless, this approach does not make 
a distinction between practical and mechanistic inference and does not provide a 
refined classification of inferences as magnitude-based inference does.  Minimum-
effect tests share with magnitude-based inference the advantage that the test result 
is not an artefact of sample size, but is limited to retaining or rejecting the hypothesis 
of a minimal effect, does not distinguish positive/beneficial and negative/harmful 
effects, and does not distinguish between an unclear effect and a clear effect. 
The use of confidence intervals has also been proposed as an alternative to NHST.  
For example, Cumming (2014) presents six approaches to interpreting confidence 
intervals, but does not use a smallest important effect size as a meaningful reference 
and does not provide guidance for making inferences in relation to such an effect 
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size.  Furthermore, confidence intervals are used in equivalence testing and non-
inferiority testing.10  The purpose of the first is to establish that two treatments 
equally good, for example with respect to a specified size of mean difference delta, 
by verifying that the confidence intervals exceed a difference of neither -1/2delta nor 
+ 1/2delta (Head et al., 2012).  The purpose of the second is to establish that one 
treatment is not worse than a second treatment, for example with respect to a 
specified size of mean difference delta, by verifying that the confidence intervals do 
not exceed a difference of -delta (Head et al., 2012).  First, the statistics that are 
calculated, and second, arguably even more important, the types of conclusion that 
can be drawn from equivalence testing differ from those that apply to magnitude-
based inference.  In particular, when used in conjunction with NHST, equivalence 
testing allows a limited range of potential conclusions: equivalence (which could be 
considered to mean the same as ‘trivial’ in magnitude-based inference), difference 
(reject the null hypothesis) or otherwise indeterminate (Tryon, 2001).  In contrast, 
magnitude-based inference allows a considerably richer set of potential conclusions, 
consisting of unclear (collect more data) and otherwise combinations of the form 
<Qualifier 1> beneficial/<Qualifier 2> trivial/<Qualifier 3> harmful, where each 
qualifier is from the range of seven descriptors presented in Table 1.   
Bayesian statistical inference has also been proposed as an alternative to NHST and 
shares with magnitude-based inference the advantage that inference is not an 
artefact of sample size (Kruschke, 2011).  In this approach the researcher’s prior 
belief is adjusted based on the data that have been collected.  However, providing 
believable estimates of prior beliefs is considered a major obstacle (Bland & Altman, 
                                            
10 In contrast, superiority testing aims to show that one treatment is better than a second treatment.  
This is typically done through NHST, but – as argued theoretically and demonstrated empirically in 
this paper – magnitude-based inference provides an attractive alternative. 
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1998; see also Dienes, 2011).  Moreover, there is doubt about the accessibility, 
comprehensibility and usability of this approach for researchers (Hopkins, 2006a).  
For instance, although it is possible to specify a range of effect sizes corresponding 
with the experimental hypothesis through a distribution of prior probabilities on effect 
sizes, the understandability and usability, for (user) researchers, of this specification 
in relation to the research design of an experiment or other study remains in doubt.  
In contrast, effect size measures, such as d for difference in mean score between a 
control condition and an experimental condition, that are used in magnitude-based 
inference to define the smallest important effect are widely published and have a 
familiar interpretation.  In any case, in Bayesian inference, as in NHST and 
magnitude-based inference, the obtained effect size needs to be reported as well 
(Wetzels et al., 2011). 
Still, Bayesian inference through model comparison (Kruschke, 2011), for example 
by way of the Bayesian t test (Rouder et al., 2009; Dienes, 2011) has the advantage 
of avoiding a dichotomous (as in NHST) or trichotomous (as in equivalence testing, 
combined with NHST) decision.   The Bayes factor is an odds that is used in the 
Bayesian t test and represents the change in a researcher’s belief towards the 
experimental hypothesis as a result of the collected data (Bayes factor > 3) or 
towards the null hypothesis (Bayes factor < 1/3).  It can be interpreted through a 
refined scheme for inference (Jeffreys, 1961, cited in Wagenmakers et al., 2011), 
ranging from extreme/very strong/strong/substantial/anecdotal evidence for the null 
hypothesis to no evidence to anecdotal/substantial/strong/very strong/extreme 
evidence for the experimental hypothesis.  However, it is important to note that the 
Bayes factor “can vary dramatically depending on the choice of alternative-model 
prior distribution” (Kruschke, 2011, p. 307).  Moreover, a potential disadvantage of 
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using the Bayes factor is that its use may suffer from the same problem of using the 
odds of benefit to harm in magnitude-based inference (see our example in Section 
5.1.1): even if the (absolute value of the) probability supporting the favoured 
hypothesis is small, the odds may be large, thereby providing inflated evidence in 
favour.   
As an alternative to Bayesian model comparison, Kruschke (2011) offers Bayesian 
interval parameter estimation.  This involves calculating the 95% highest-density 
interval of parameter values for each model parameter, containing 95% of the 
parameter’s distribution.  The values contained in this interval have higher credibility 
than those outside of it.  This first interval is compared with a second interval around 
the null value (region of practical equivalence) to evaluate the credibility of this value.  
The null value can be rejected (no overlap between the two intervals) or accepted 
(the first interval is contained in the second interval) or judgement can be suspended 
(partial overlap).  It is important to note that the proportion of the first interval 
contained in the second, which forms the basis of inference here, can be highly 
sensitive to the limits of the first interval (Kruschke, 2011).   
Recently, Trafimow and Marks (2015) have – as editorial policy – declared an 
outright ban on the use of NHST and confidence intervals.  They also find much of 
Bayesian inference problematic.  Instead, they demand the reporting of “strong 
descriptive statistics, including effect sizes” (p. 1). 
There has been a growth in the application of magnitude-based inference in meta-
analyses in sport and exercise science (e.g., Weston et al., 2014). Meta-analyses 
are essential tools for summarising evidence accurately; statistical methods are used 
to summarise and combine the results of independent studies (Liberati et al., 2009).  
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Analysis of the overall effect – the main output statistic of meta-analysis – via 
magnitude-based inference again provides a more informative qualitative descriptor 
for the ‘pooled effect’.  For example, an overall meta-analysed effect size 
(standardised mean difference) of 1.0 would be qualified as moderate, yet using 
magnitude-based inference such an effect could be reported as possibly/likely/very 
likely/almost certainly moderate, depending upon the width of the associated 
confidence interval (Weston et al., 2014). Further, when an unclear effect is present, 
qualitative descriptors can be provided for the upper and lower end of the confidence 
interval to provide the likely range of the effect. For example, in the meta-analysis of 
Weston et al. (2014) an unclear effect was reported for the effect of high-intensity 
training on power output, yet the authors quantified the upper and lower end of the 
likely range of effects and reported that: “training had an unclear effect on sprint 
power that could at most be a moderate beneficial or a small harmful effect”. 
7. Limitations 
We have argued for magnitude-based inference, with important benefits for making 
inferences in user research.  However, limitations of this type of inference can be 
identified, some apparent and others substantive. 
7.1. Apparent limitations 
In magnitude-based inference, the researcher needs to make several choices or 
accept recommended choices, for example about Type-1 and Type-2 practical-error 
rates, the smallest important effect and the mapping of quantitative probabilities onto 
qualitative descriptors.  Recommended choices are cogently argued (e.g., Hopkins, 
2007) and may be reasonable for many user research studies.  However, it is 
important to note that magnitude-based inference forces researchers to make these 
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choices explicit, assisted (among other things) by a language to describe 
probabilities qualitatively (see Table 1).  A researcher can choose their own 
mapping, but would have to justify their choices to convince their 
reviewers/editors/readers.  Instead of presenting an apparent limitation, this need to 
make choices explicit highlights limitations of NHST, in which Type-I and Type-II 
error rates are typically constrained by conventions that are deemed too 
conservative (leading to conclusions of unclear results that could be important and 
sample sizes that may be larger than necessary; Hopkins, 2007) and in which the 
definition of a smallest important effect has no influence on the inference that is 
made.  By offering a rich range of possible inferences (aided by a mapping of 
probability ranges onto descriptors) rather than the two or three inferences in NHST, 
magnitude-based inference avoids the temptation of ‘fiddling’ the significance level 
that is used in NHST. 
By definition, the choice of smallest important effect size, which then affects 
inferences, remains subjective.  However, an informed choice can be guided by 
considerations discussed in Section 4.1.3 and the unrealistic choice of an effect size 
of 0 in NHST is also subjective.  Still, a concern might be that an unscrupulous 
researcher might ‘revise’ the choice of smallest important effect to produce a more 
favourable inference.  However, an attempt to do so would be futile.  This is because 
researchers using MBI will have to convince their reviewers/editors/readers that the 
researchers’ choice of smallest important effect is sensible.  
Reviewers/editors/readers will not be convinced if the researchers’ choice is not 
presented with a credible rationale.  In contrast, with NHST researchers select a null 
effect without any attempt to convince the reader that is a sensible choice, even 
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though many publications have previously argued before that this choice is not 
sensible. 
The choice of a common smallest important effect size facilitates the comparison of 
magnitude-based inferences between studies.  However, even when different 
choices were originally made by different researchers conducting different studies, 
the results can still be compared by ‘equalising’ the choices, if the results are 
presented in one of the various publicly available spreadsheets 
(http://www.sportsci.org/).  For example, the same set of studies can be compared 
under a small, medium or large smallest important effect size. 
Although the publicly available spreadsheets support various common effect 
statistics, it cannot be claimed that any conceivably useful statistic will be supported.  
Nevertheless, existing spreadsheets (http://www.sportsci.org/) offer a range of 
analyses.  In any case, based on existing statistical theory (Smithson, 2003), 
spreadsheet calculations can be added to support other directional statistics, thus 
making this type of inference even more practically useful. 
A requirement for the analyses presented in this paper is normality of the sampling 
distribution of the outcome statistic.  Hopkins et al. (2009, p. 8) take the view that 
“the central-limit theorem ensures that the sampling distribution is close enough to 
normal for accurate inferences, even when sample sizes are small (about 10) and 
especially after a transformation that reduces any marked skewness in the 
dependent variable or nonuniformity of error”.  They discourage the use of non-
parametric analyses because of a lack of power, and the inability to adjust for 
covariates and to permit inferences about magnitude.  However, bootstrapping is 
offered (with a supporting spreadsheet) as an alternative in cases where a normal 
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sampling distribution cannot be assumed or established, for instance when non-
linear relationships are modelled (Hopkins, 2012), to provide robust estimates of 
confidence intervals and magnitude-based probabilities.11  Moreover, bootstrapping 
can be used more generally for any effect statistic by researchers who take a more 
sceptical view of the normality of sampling distributions. 
7.2. Substantive limitations 
Welsh and Knight (2014) analyse the use of magnitude-based inference in the 
comparison of two means.  Their substantive claim against magnitude-based 
inference is that it inflates the probability of detecting an effect that does not exist.  
Batterham and Hopkins (2014) provide evidence against this claim and other claims 
regarding magnitude-based inference made by Welsh and Knight (2014).  
Irrespective of the veracity of the claim of inflated false alarms in magnitude-based 
inference, researchers who are concerned about this could reduce this possibility. 
This can be achieved by prudently deciding not to make inferences of a substantial 
effect of positivity/benefit with outcomes that are qualified as possibly 
positive/beneficial (chances between 25% and 75%), but to make inferences of a 
substantial effect only with higher chances (at or above 75%). 
The decision rules themselves for mechanistic inference and practical inference are 
cogently argued (Batterham & Hopkins, 2006; Hopkins, 2007), but do not necessarily 
take all relevant factors into account (irrespective of whether one agrees on the 
recommended values for, for example, the numerical values of the probability for a 
                                            
11 Bootstrapping is a statistical resampling technique that is used to create confidence intervals and 
test statistical hypotheses, without the need to make distributional assumptions.  From the original 
sample data, a large number of samples (e.g., N = 5000) is taken by sampling with replacement.  
From each sample the statistic that is of interest (e.g., the mean) is calculated and used to create a 
confidence interval or an inferential statistic to test a hypothesis. 
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Type-1 practical error and a Type-2 practical error).  For example, as presented in 
the literature, magnitude-based inference does not (yet) take into account the 
(financial) value inputs to and outputs from using a harmful or beneficial effect 
(Hopkins, 2007).  A practical decision may have to be based on these considerations 
as well.  Existing literature on cost-justifying usability work (e.g., Bias & Mayhew, 
2005) does not consider the possibility of using magnitude-based inference in user-
research studies.  A related approach would be to use utility analysis to define a 
smallest important effect (Murphy & Myors, 1999).  This takes into account the 
financial value of the benefit (effect/dependent variable) and cost (for example 
change from a [cheaper] existing to new [more expensive] version of product or level 
of an independent variable).  The idea is that, if sufficient variance in the dependent 
variable is explained by the independent variable to offset the cost, then the change 
to a new product can be justified.  A utility equation is solved to determine the 
minimum effect size, expressed as a correlation between the independent and the 
dependent variable, to achieve this offset.  Other variables in the equation are the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable and the cost (e.g., price increase of 
new product over existing product).12  In case a different effect size measure (e.g., 
the standardised mean difference d) than the correlation coefficient is desired, the 
value of the smallest important correlation value can be converted (Clark-Carter, 
2009) to the desired effect size measure, once the equation has been solved. 
Still, even if the decision rules of magnitude-based inference are not perfect, as 
theoretically argued in this paper and illustrated with examples of the results of 
analysing user-study data, decision-making in magnitude-based inference can be 
                                            
12 U = rxy  SDy - C, projected overall benefit U, correlation coefficient rxy, standard deviation of the 
dependent variable SDy, cost C. 
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considered as an important advance over decision-making in NHST.  In particular, 
this inference can help to avoid making decisions that are based on the unrealistic 
smallest important null-effect size and that may be too conservative, by taking into 
account the smallest important effect in the inference that is being made and by 
using meaningful and intuitively appealing descriptors for qualifying probabilities, and 
inferences are never an artefact of sample size. 
8. Recommendations 
Although the use of magnitude-based inference has apparently not yet been 
reported in the literature on user research and human-computer interaction more 
generally, the generic recommendations for the application of this approach (see 
below) are in principle the same as those in sport and exercise science.  However, in 
all disciplines, researchers will need to choose a smallest important effect size, 
which will differ, depending on specific considerations in the design of a particular 
experiment or other study.  The supporting spreadsheets are flexible in the sense 
that they allow researchers to specify various parameters, including the smallest 
important effect size.  Moreover, a range of analyses is available. 
In this paper, we have presented various benefits that magnitude-based inference 
offers and provided illustrations from user research.  Naturally, it is up to our readers 
to decide which approach to use in their research, taking into account our argument 
and results.  Our recommendations are as follows when magnitude-based inference 
is used. 
1 Where possible, plan sample size using magnitude-based inference.  Plan sample 
size in advance or, better according to Hopkins (2006a), ‘on the fly’ (in a group 
sequential design, where data are collected until a clear outcome emerges).  
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Otherwise, retrospectively compare the actual sample size with the required sample 
size to gain an understanding of the appropriateness of the former. 
2 Consistent with existing practice, analyse data using tests of the null hypothesis 
with a common statistical package or spreadsheet.  However, augment existing 
practice by making more informative use of the results as input for magnitude-based 
inference. 
3 Always analyse data using mechanistic inference.  Also use practical inference for 
effects that have a direct practical application.   
4 Use appropriate spreadsheets to facilitate sample size estimation and magnitude-
based inference (http://www.sportsci.org/). 
5 When preparing for journal publication, write to the journal editor arguing cogently 
why it is appropriate to use magnitude-based inference in your research.  In your 
section Data Analysis explain the specific magnitude-based inference that you have 
used (e.g., Barnes et al., 2015). 
9. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to be translational by theoretically making the case for an 
alternative approach to statistical data analysis, called magnitude-based inference, 
with several benefits for research in human-computer interaction, and by empirically 
illustrating this approach and its advantages with examples from user research.  We 
discussed theoretical benefits of the approach and our example numerical results 
from designs that are common in user research showed in detail how the approach 
can be advantageous.  Researchers can continue their existing practice of analysing 
data using tests of the null hypothesis, but make more informative use of the results 
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by using these as input for magnitude-based inference making.  In conclusion, 
magnitude-based inference is an attractive alternative approach, which can produce 
informative inferences in user research.  We look forward to the fruitful application of 
this approach in user research, human-computer interaction more generally and 
beyond. 
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